CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE NOVEL '*KOKORO*'

In this chapter some linguistic theories, which are used as the framework for this research, will be introduced. Findings from previous research related to '*Kokoro*', done mostly by Japanese literary scholars, will also be presented since they are useful for understanding the conceptual structure underlying the plot of the novel. This chapter is mainly divided into two parts:

1) A discussion of the linguistic theories—mainly from the domain of cognitive linguistics—concerning conceptual metaphors that have been influenced by findings from the social sciences, and

2) Previous research related to the novel '*Kokoro*' which will serve to help in understanding how Japanese society and culture are reflected in the conceptual structure of the emotions of the main figure, Sensei, and a lesser degree that of K in part three of the novel.

2.1 Theoretical Background

The theories which are used as a framework for this research, are based mostly on cognitive linguistics theories as suggested by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), Lakoff and Turner (1989). The theories of Kusumi (1996a) and (1996b), a Japanese cognitive linguist, will also be used to support the Japanese conceptual structures of emotions and the cultural particularities underlying their conceptualization. 'Conceptual structure' as used here means the structure underlying the formation of one's thoughts, ideas, or principles. So the Japanese conceptual structure indicates the formation of thoughts, ideas, or principles shared in Japanese

society and culture. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:7) emphasize their viewpoints through the analysis of metaphors used in our daily lives, stating that metaphors support our conceptual structures:

> Since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to metaphorical concepts in a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the nature of metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities.

But this in itself would be of little use if it could not be claimed that the cognitive system we use in perceiving the world, as well as, in subcategorizing it and talking about it, was construed according to the values of the specific culture we have been brought up in. And it is exactly these cultural values that determine how we conceptualize the world. The specifics of this conceptualization will be reflected linguistically in the metaphors used in a given language. This is why this study undertakes analysis of the conceptual structure of primarily emotional expressions in part three of the novel '*Kokoro*', the goal being to account for the particularities of Japanese thinking and reasoning as reflected in the use of metaphorical language in the broadest sense of the term in the above mentioned novel. This reflection also explains why linguists regard metaphors and metonymies as cognitive concepts mapped onto linguistic expressions. Therefore, the data are composed primarily of metaphors and metonymies found in the text investigated. In addition to metaphors and metonymies, more linguistic expressions will be made use of, namely, 'sound symbolic words', 'repetition' and 'simile', as far as they can be shown to support extracting conceptual structures.

When cognitive linguists use the term 'metaphor', it must be kept in mind that they understand it differently from its use in traditional linguistic or literary research, where it is considered a figure of speech. In cognitive linguistics, metaphors are seen as underlying thoughts along the lines which we think and act, react, and understand.

We start by looking at metaphors and metonymies as their conception has changed by moving from a traditional linguistic viewpoint to that of cognitive linguistics.

2.1.1 Development from the traditional linguistic conception to a cognitive conception of metaphors and metonymies

2.1.1.1 Figure of speech as the traditional conception

Out of the various kinds of figurative expressions possible this paper only deals with simile, metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche, since they are the vehicles in our study. First, the traditional linguistic conception, which is generally used in non-cognitive linguistic fields, is introduced so as to give general information.

According to the traditional framework, a metaphor, along with other rhetoric elements, is considered a 'figure of speech'. For example, 'The Longman Dictionary of Applied Linguistics' defines a figure of speech as:

> A word or phrase which is used for special effect, and which does not have its usual or literal meaning. The two most common figures of speech are the **simile** and the **metaphor** but there are many other less common ones (Richards et al. 1985:105).

This implies that, following the traditional viewpoint, metaphors and metonymies, similes, synecdoche, and other rhetorical devices are considered to be figures of speech. Some of these are more or less ornamental, special or higher elements are used primarily in rhetorical style as it is found in poetic language. This means that figures of speech are seen as being primarily restricted to literary language.

"A simile is an expression by which something is compared to something else by the use of function words such as *like* or *as*" (Richards et al. 1985:105). These function words are hedges indicating that the respective linguistic expression is meant to be a 'simile'. For example, in the sentence 'Rikio's skin is white as snow', Rikio's skin

color is compared to the color of snow. So, in this case, it is made evident, that Rikio's skin and snow share the color 'white'.

'Longman's Dictionary of Contemporary English' defines metaphor as:

> (The use of) an expression which means or describes one thing or idea using words usually used of something else with very similar qualities (as in *the sunshine of her smile* or *The rain came down in buckets.*) without using the words **as** or **like** (Summer, ed. 1987:654).

Richards (1985:106) defines metaphor as "an expression in which something is described by stating another thing with which it can be compared without any function words". Usually a metaphor is formed as 'A is B', where 'A' is a topic and 'B' is a vehicle. In the example 'Rikio is a walking dictionary', Rikio is not actually a walking dictionary, but the effect is compared to how much knowledge he can recall easily. The grammatical difference between a simile and a metaphor is that a simile uses function words, indicating a comparison, whereas a metaphor does not.

Metonymy is "the use of words in a figurative sense involving association" (Larson 1984:111). For example, we say 'I had three dishes'. However, 'a dish' cannot be eaten. Here, the special collocation with 'dish' does not mean the 'kitchen utensil' we put food onto, but it rather refers to the 'food' which is on this dish. It is the three dishes of food which 'I had'. This is, what we call, a space-related metonymy, since dish and food share the same space. Ungerer and Schmid (1996:115) call this

> A relation of contiguity' (i.e. nearness or neighborhood) between what is denoted by the literal meaning of a word and its figurative counterpart.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980:35) give an example to clearly distinguish metonymy from metaphor. In the sentence, "The *ham sandwich* is waiting for his check", 'the ham sandwich' is used to refer to the real person who had the ham sandwich. Lakoff and Johnson point out that this is not a personification metaphor in the sense of imputing

human qualities to things that are not human. Rather, as they say: "we are using one entity to refer to another that is related to it" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:35).

Synecdoche is based on part-whole, species-genus and singular-plural relationships. This figurative expression is very common in Japanese, so there are many occurrences of it in the text *'Kokoro'*. For example, in Japanese one says *anata no kao o mini kita*[9] 'I came to see your face'. Here, 'face', which is a part of the person, is substituted for the whole of the person. As objectives of Lakoff and Johnson's studies, they deal with not only metaphors but also metonymy and synecdoche, which had not been paid much attention before in cognitive linguistics. However, they include synecdoche as a part of metonymy.

So far, four types of figures of speech—simile, metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche—have been introduced. Although some of quotations and definitions that have been made use of are from cognitive linguists, the definitions are all considered as the traditional concept for the cognitive linguists. A cognitive conception is going to be dealt with in detail in the following section of this chapter.

2.1.1.2 Cognitive conception

Cognitive linguists, such as Lakoff, Johnson, Turner, and Kovecses, just to mention few, start off from a different viewpoint than the traditional one. They focus not on literary language or even language use in general that is considered traditional when talking about figures of speech. However, they consider the main mental concepts underlying and thus governing our use of language. Cognitive linguistics claims that the way we make use of our respective languages must be analyzed in relation to the way in which we conceptualize the world around us. This implies that any culture

[9] Japanese example in this thesis utilize a method of Romanization commonly used in linguistic and literary research.

will strongly influence the figures of speech used by a certain language community. But it is not sufficient to point out that the starting point of cognitive linguistics differs from the traditional viewpoint. If it becomes important to take into consideration how a language community perceives and conceptualizes the world, the consequence must be that a linguist will want to look for a reflection of this conceptualization in the way language is used. That is what cognitive linguists do. So they are able to point out that figures of speech are used most frequently in daily language, although they may be more elaborate in literary speech. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:3) conclude that "metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action". And further, Lakoff and Turner (1989:xi) say,

> But great poets, as master craftsman, use basically the same tools we use; what makes them different is their talent for using these tools, and their skill in using them which they acquire from sustained attention, study, and practice.

Another important point which underlines the difference between the traditional and the cognitive conception in how a metaphor is understood is that the cognitive conception focuses on the claim that "*The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another* (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:5)", while traditional linguists hold the position that a metaphor is understood mainly by the notion of 'similarity' or 'comparison' between the literal and the figurative meaning of an expression, not by one through another.

2.1.1.3 Importance of metaphors and metonymies as tools for cognitive research

Lakoff and Johnson (1980:3) point out the importance of metaphors and metonymies as cognitive tools by saying:

> Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature... If we are right in

> suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor.

We use metaphors unconsciously and automatically without paying attention to them. To find out what our conceptual structure might be like, Lakoff and Johnson claim that looking at our language is one of the ways to retrieve information about our cognitive, and thus, conceptual setup. Their point of view forms the framework of this thesis,

> Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:3).

Although this concept, taken in isolation - especially without any evidence from the neurobiological and neuropsychological sciences - does not provide us with so called 'hard facts', it still is a reliable approach to analyzing the conceptual structure of the language spoken by a language community. In comparing the results obtained from different languages we might find a clue not only to the cultural specifics underlying the conceptual structure of a language, but also be in a position to see which traits are universal. If we look at metaphors and metonymies from this angle, we should be in a position to understand why the linguistic analysis of phenomena like metaphors and metonymies is of the most crucial importance for promoting research in any cognitive domain, including linguistics.

2.1.1.4 Conventionalized metaphor

The 'dead' metaphor is an expression which is understood directly without paying attention to it being a metaphor at all. Could it be worth analyzing at all? Dead metaphors are what is more commonly referred to as being 'conventionalized' or 'lexicalized' metaphors. They are so constantly used within a certain linguistic form, and by this have been 'conventionalized' in the speech community to the extent that

the expressions are 'lexicalized' and entered in a dictionary with just one lexical meaning given. They are actually not recognized as metaphors by the speakers of a language. Such unrecognized metaphors, considered as part of the literal meaning of words, might be considered as non-useful as cognitive tools. On the contrary, Lakoff and Turner claim these expressions are the most important ones.

> The mistake derives from a basic confusion: it assumes that those things in our cognition that are most alive and most active are those that are conscious. On the contrary, those that are most alive and most deeply entrenched, efficient, and powerful are those that are so automatic as to be unconscious and effortless (1989:129).

So far we have looked at the difference between what may be called the traditional viewpoint and the cognitive conception of, mainly, metaphors and metonymies, focussing on the background for the cognitivist position. Apart from this we talked about: 1) general and basic definitions of figures of speech, 2) how important metaphors and metonymies are as cognitive tools, 3) which kind of metaphor is the most useful and important for analyzing the conceptual structure of a speaker. In the following section, 2.1.2, we will concentrate on conceptual metaphors and metonymies as they are being used as tools in a cognitive linguistics analysis.

2.1.2 Conceptual metaphors and metonymies in cognitive linguistics

The essence of a metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another. This is also called the 'metaphor model'. The important point from the cognitive view is that the connections and relations that a metaphor establishes between different conceptual categories play an important role Traditionally a metaphor is understood as a semantic extension of the properties of one category onto another category belonging to a different domain. Metaphorical concepts help us to understand a so far unknown experience through activating concepts we have experienced in another domain. Thus, what we understand is linked and governed by experiences we have had so far. The experiences draw on interrelations from our

overall conceptual system, which stands for our general knowledge of 'the world'. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) say that connecting two isolated items is possibly done by drawing upon so-called "experiential gestalts". Therefore, a metaphorical concept is to be understood as a device for transferring 'experiential gestalts' from one domain to another domain, thus adding to our overall understanding.

2.1.2.1 Experiential gestalt

The term 'gestalt' was originally coined by gestalt psychologists. While we are not going to deal with the psychological implications, because they are not within the scope of this thesis, Lakoff and Johnson (1980:81) state that:

> ...*experiential gestalts are multidimensional structured wholes*. Their dimensions, in turn, are defined in terms of directly emergent concepts. That is, the various dimensions are categories that emerge naturally from our experience.

The notion of gestalt is explained by Ungerer and Schmid (1996:33) as a holistic perception of multidimensional structures making use of the following gestalt principles:

- 'principle of proximity': individual elements with a small distance between them will be perceived as being somehow related to each other.
- 'principle of similarity': individual elements that are similar tend to be perceived as one common segment.
- 'principle of closure': perceptual organization tends to be anchored in closed figures.
- 'principle of continuation': elements will be perceived as wholes if they only have few interruptions.

Understanding A in terms of B involves being able to superimpose the multidimensional structure of parts of the concept B upon the corresponding structure of A.

2.1.2.2 Cognitive model and cultural model

Cognitive models largely depend on cultural models, because we construct our cognitive models drawing on the experiences we make in our respective cultures. For this reason, cognitive and cultural models cannot be seen independently from each other. Therefore the necessity arises to have a closer look at both types of models.

Lakoff and Turner (1989:66) define a cognitive model as a strategy that "we use in comprehending our experience and in reasoning about it". They continue:

> Cognitive models are not conscious models; they are unconscious and used automatically and effortlessly. We cannot observe them directly; they are inferred from their effects (Lakoff and Turner 1989:65-66).

Ungerer and Schmid (1996:47) define cognitive models as our knowledge bases which cover all the stored cognitive representations that belong to a certain domain as given below:

> It stands to reason that for all kinds of phenomena that we come across in everyday life, we have experienced and stored a large number of interrelated contexts. Cognitive categories are not just depending on the immediate context in which they are embedded, but also on this whole bundle of contexts that are associated with it.

Ungerer and Schmid (1996:49-50) also go on to describe the differences between cognitive models and cultural models as follows:

> Cognitive models, ... represent a cognitive, basically psychological, view of the stored knowledge about a certain field. Since psychological states are always private and individual experiences, descriptions of such cognitive models necessarily involve a considerable degree of idealization. In other words, description of

> cognitive models are based on the assumption that many people have roughly the same basic knowledge about things. However, ... cognitive models are of course not universal, but depend on the culture in which a person grows up and lives. The culture provides the background for all the situations that we have to experience in order to be able to form a cognitive model. So cognitive models for particular domains ultimately depend on so-called **cultural models**. In reverse, cultural models can be seen as cognitive models that are shared by people belonging to a social group or subgroup.

Lakoff and Turner (1989) claim that there are at least two ways to acquire cognitive models. One is by our own direct experience and another is through our culture. The one acquired through our culture is called the "cultural model". "Cognitive models that are acquired via our culture are typically models that are long-standing in the culture" (Lakoff and Turner 1989:66). To illustrate cultural models which differ from our scientific knowledge, Lakoff and Turner (1989:66) give an example of wolves:

> Experts on wolves maintain that wolves avoid humans whenever they can; nevertheless, our cultural model of wolves sees them as vicious beasts that attack humans without provocation, often cruelly.

In short, cultural models are subordinate to cognitive models. So, cognitive models are not always cultural models, but all cultural models belong to cognitive models. This indicates that we can establish a hierarchy, stating that the cognitive model would hold the topmost level, because it would in part be determined in the scientific world (although the individual person would, of course not partake actively in all this knowledge), and on a lower level we would find the diversity of cultural models as they can be found worldwide. This, of course, is only meant to be an abstraction, because I am well aware of the fact, that within both levels we would have to situate each individual's personal models, as they have been built up according to the historical period he lived / lives in, as well as of his own (individual) cultural experiences. But still, it does not seem too farfetched an idea to speak of a national cultural model as well as cognitive models, as will be seen in analyzing the novel '*Kokoro*' in detail.

How do we conceptualize the cognitive model? Ungerer and Schmid (1996:122) explain by making use of the example of the cognitive model ARGUMENT as follows:

> In traditional semantic terms we can distinguish three meanings of the word *argument*. Apart from 'line of thought', an argument can be a 'disagreement or quarrel', and finally a 'reason given to support or undermine something'. However, these paraphrases do not capture in any way the wealth of information that we have stored in relation to the cognitive model ARGUMENT: the stages through which arguments usually go; the characteristic pattern of exchanges between the participants; the purposes pursued by the cognitive model may not be very helpful in distinguishing between different meanings of *argument*. In fact, they illustrate how closely the various meanings are linked by a shared conceptual structure, and it is this structure that cognitive linguists have been interested in.

So far, the cognitive model can only be undertaken by analyzing different linguistic expressions used in concepts uttered by a speaker of a certain language, or by help of methods from psycholinguistics. Traditional linguistic methods, as they are used in descriptive linguistics to analyze the grammatical system of a given language seem of little help here, as long as we are not in a position to say what our brains really do when we connect our knowledge about the world with our use of language in its broadest sense, including any form of figurative speech. Thus, activating our respective cognitive models, methods as they are being used in the natural sciences cannot contribute to analyze our conceptual structure or any use we make of it.

2.1.2.3 Three types of conceptual metaphors

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) categorize our human conceptual metaphors into three different types: 1) structural metaphors, 2) ontological metaphors, and 3) orientational metaphors. Table 1 which presents an overview of three types of conceptual metaphors with definitions and some examples extracted from Lakoff and Johnson (1980).

Types	Definitions	Examples (Lakoff and Johnson: 1980)
Structural Metaphor	The concept which is metaphorically structured in terms of another	ARGUMENT IS WAR TIME IS MONEY
Ontological Metaphor	The concept in which events, activities, emotions, ideas are viewed as entities and substance	ARGUMENT IS A CONTAINER THE MIND IS A MACHINE
Orientational Metaphor	The concept which organizes a whole system of concepts with respect to one another (spatial orientations)	HAPPY IS UP SAD IS DOWN

Table 1: Three types of conceptual metaphors

A structural metaphor is defined as the case "... where one concept is metaphorically structured in terms of another" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:14). An example of this type of metaphor would be: ARGUMENT IS WAR to demonstrate how pervasive a metaphor is in our everyday life. It is discussed at the beginning of Lakoff and Johnson's book to illustrate their idea that we live by metaphors (cf. the title of the book: 'Metaphors we live by'). This structural metaphor, ARGUMENT IS WAR involves two concepts; one being ARGUMENT as the target domain, the other being WAR as the source domain. We understand ARGUMENT by transferring the structure, the internal relations or the logic of a cognitive model from the source domain WAR onto the target domain ARGUMENT. This transfer is called 'metaphorical mapping'. The following italicized linguistic expressions from Lakoff and Johnson (1980:4) are some examples given to highlight the idea behind a structural metaphor:

He *attacked every weak point* in my argument.

I've never *won* an argument with him.

If you use that *strategy*, he will *wipe you out*.

The authors conclude:

> It is important to see that we don't just *talk* about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we *do* in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:4).

Although the concepts presented by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have been taken from English, they can equally be applied to Japanese. A very similar concept of WAR will be discussed making use of the concept, LOVE IS WAR, in chapter three of this thesis. It must be kept in mind, however, that each concept as just a structural factor is never understood by only one other metaphor, but normally by making reference to aspects from several conceptual domains:

> The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another...will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept. In allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept... a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:10).

In the example of the ARGUMENT concept we will have to draw upon other metaphors as well. ARGUMENT as a concept is thus structured by several metaphors, one of them being ARGUMENT IS A CONTAINER, which also contributes to our understanding of the concept of ARGUMENT. A metaphor, ARGUMENT IS A CONTAINER, falls within the domain that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) call an ontological metaphor.

According to the authors, an ontological metaphor corresponds to "ways of viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substance" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:25) This means that we look at our experiences as objects we can treat as discrete entities, so that we can understand something unclear through something clear, or something structurally ambiguous through something structurally well-

known, or something we haven't experienced through something we already have experienced. By looking at experiences this way "we can refer to them, categorize them, group them, and quantify them—and, by this means, reason about them" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:25). Look at the example of ARGUMENT IS A CONTAINER by Lakoff and Johnson (1980:92).

> Your argument doesn't have much *content*.
>
> That argument *has holes* in it.
>
> You don't have much *of* an argument, but his objections have even *less substance*.

In this case, viewing argument as a container allows us to refer to it, to quantify it, and "perhaps even believe that we understand it. Ontological metaphors like this are necessary for even attempting to deal rationally with our experiences" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:26).

Thus, abstract concepts such as ARGUMENT are defined by using several concepts which are concrete and structured. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) talk about "scripts", "schema", and "frames" as the framework for explaining these conceptual structures.

Concepts in both a structural metaphor and an ontological metaphor are understood in terms of another domains as explained in the previous sections. However, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) believe that there are some cognitive concepts which do not necessarily depend on any other metaphors at all, but which are understood directly. This kind of metaphor is called an "orientational metaphor". An orientational metaphor is "... a metaphorical concept, one that does not structure one concept in terms of another, but organizes a whole system of concepts with respect to one another" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:14). This metaphorical concept is called "orientational", because it has to do with spatial orientations, such as up-down, in-out,

front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:14) explain that

> These spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment. Orientational metaphors give a concept of spatial orientation; for example HAPPY IS UP.

This corresponds to what Lakoff (1987:267) has called, "image schemas" that are directly derived from everyday bodily experience. The term 'image schema' is used for the pictures based on our spatial conceptualization of abstract categories. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) illustrate their idea by means of many concepts taken from everyday life, for example, the concepts HAPPY and SAD are structured by the spatial orientation UP ; DOWN, thus leading to: HAPPY IS UP ; SAD IS DOWN. The following examples were taken out of a list given by Lakoff and Johnson (1980:15).

> I'm feeling *up*.
>
> I'm feeling *down*.
>
> My spirits *rose*.
>
> My spirits *sank*.

There are more example concepts structured by UP-DOWN ; HAVING CONTROL or FORCE IS UP ; BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL or FORCE IS DOWN, MORE IS UP ; LESS IS DOWN, HIGH STATUS IS UP ; LOW STATUS IS DOWN, GOOD IS UP ; BAD IS DOWN. All of these orientational or spatialization metaphors have an internal systematicity:

> For example, HAPPY IS UP defines a coherent system rather than a number of isolated and random cases. (An example of an incoherent system would be one where, say, "I'm feeling up" meant "I'm feeling happy," but "My spirits rose" meant "I became sadder.") (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:17f.).

Lakoff and Johnson also say that this spatial orientation is not arbitrary but based on our physical and cultural experience, so it will vary from culture to culture. However, they suggest that the way concepts are structured will be basically similar in most cultures.

2.1.2.4 Metonymy model

Lakoff and Johnson (1980:35) define the "metonymy model" as a case where "we are using one entity to refer to another that is related to it", and the expressions which fit in the model are called 'metonymy' or 'metonymic expressions'. As the use of metonymies is extremely common, Lakoff (1987:77) explains metonymy as "to take one well-understood or easy-to-perceive aspect of something and use it to stand either for the thing as a whole or for some other aspect or part of it". Lakoff and Johnson (1980:39) state that "Metonymic concepts allow us to conceptualize one thing by means of its relation to something else". In table 2, seven "general metonymic concepts" are given with some examples extracted from Lakoff and Johnson (1980:36-39).

General metonymic concepts	Examples (Lakoff and Johnson: 1980)
THE PART FOR THE WHOLE	Get your *butt* over here! We don't hire *longhairs*..
PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT	He bought a *Ford*. He's got a *Picasso* in his den.
OBJECT USED FOR USER	We need a better *glove* at third base. The buses are on strike.
CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED	*Nixon* bombed Hanoi. *Ozawa* gave a terrible concert last night.
INSTITUTION FOR PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE	You'll never get the *university* to agree to that. The *Senate* thinks abortion is immoral.
THE PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTION	The *White House* isn't saying anything. Paris is introducing longer skirts this season.
THE PLACE FOR THE EVENT	Let's not let Thailand become another *Vietnam*. *Pearl Harbor* still has an effect on our foreign policy.

Table 2: Seven general metonymic concepts

Here is an example of the concept, OBJECT FOR USER. In the English sentence, "The *ham sandwich* is waiting for his check" (Lakoff 1987:91), 'The *ham sandwich*' does not indicate the real object which is the ham sandwich, but indicates the person who ordered it. People often use name or address terms to call someone, but in the case of a restaurant where a waiter or waitress does not know the name of each customer, the food or drink a customer ordered can be used in order to identify the customer. In the example sentence, the waiter or waitress took the one easy-to-be-perceived object, *ham sandwich*, to refer to the customer who had a relation to the ham sandwich by ordering it.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980:39) claim that "metonymic concepts like these are systematic in the same way that metaphoric concepts are". These general metonymic concepts are understood according to a general principle. The principle takes the following form:

> Given an idealized cognitive model (ICM) with some background condition (e.g., institutions are located in places), there is a "stand for" relation that may hold between two elements *A* and *B*, such that one element of the ICM, *B*, may stand for another element *A*. In this case, *B* = the place and *A* = the institution. We will refer to such ICMs containing stands-for relations as *metonymic models* (Lakoff 1987:78).

We have seen both metaphor and metonymy. The way concepts are structured in metaphors and metonymies is basically similar in most cultures. The key for answering the reason of this similarity is in the 'cognitive model', which is the knowledge experienced and stored for a certain domain by individuals and social groups or cultures. Metaphors and metonymies seem to have the same definition in the sense that one entity is being used to refer to another. Considering the differences between them, it can be stated that while using a metaphor involves mapping across different cognitive domains, use of metonymy involves mapping within the same domain. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:36) provide an idea of the differences in the process involved by the use of a metaphor versus the use of a metonymy by saying :

> Metaphor is principally a way of conceiving of one thing in terms of another, and its primary function is understanding. Metonymy, on the other hand, has primarily a referential function, that is, it allows us to use one entity to *stand for* another.

In addition, the authors mention that a metonymy not only has a referential function, but also the function of providing understanding. So the authors conclude:

> Metonymic concepts allow us to conceptualize one thing by means of its relation to something else. ... Thus, like metaphors, metonymic concepts structure not just our language but our thoughts, attitudes, and actions. And, like metaphoric concepts, metonymic concepts are grounded in our experience. In fact, the grounding of metonymic concepts is in general more obvious than it is the case with metaphoric concepts, since it usually involves direct physical or causal associations (1980:39).

2.1.3 Sound symbolic words

Sound symbolic word (SW), often called 'sound-symbolism', is a term used to refer to 'a direct association between the form and the meaning of language. Japanese SWs are generally referred to as *'giongo-gitaigo'*. According to the definitions of Makino (1986), there are three types of symbolic words: 1) *giseigo/giongo* 'phonomimes' which are direct representations of actual sounds in every day life, called 'onomatopoeia' in English. These include words such as 'cuckoo', 'murmur', and 'bang bang', 2) *gitaigo* 'phenomimes' which refers to phonetic, the sound of human speech, representations of phenomena perceptible by non-auditory senses, 3) *gijoogo* 'psychomimes' which refers to phonetic representations of human psychological states. English onomatopoeias like 'bang bang' are not fully integrated into adult language. However, Japanese makes abundant use of SWs which express sensations and emotions, and they thus constitute an integral part of adult language both in spoken and written Japanese. Hasada (n.d.) states that "Japanese is rich in psychomimes which describe various emotional states/sensations".

At a first glance it may seem strange to talk about sound symbolic words (SWs) in the context of this investigation. In Japanese, even in literary speech, however, SWs play a most important role as cognitive tools. Hasada (n.d.) repeatedly proposed that frequent use of SW expressions in Japanese reveals a preference for expressions associated with concrete images when a speaker is describing the abstract domain of emotional states/sensations. It has been suggested that the Japanese preference for extensive use of sound symbolic words is somehow related to the way Japanese people think. The reason for this could be seen in the fact that SWs convey and evoke concrete images. Japanese people generally prefer concrete expressions to abstract ones. In relation to the cognitive conception of metaphors and metonymies, for example, it could be stated that SWs and metaphors, as well as metonymies, are pervasive in our everyday life in thought, and they help us understand abstract phenomena in terms of rather concrete images. Another reason for the frequent use of SWs in Japanese lies in the lexicon:

> Japanese has a relatively small variety of adjectives or verbs for emotional expression, one can convey various emotions and sensations by a developed set of sound symbolic words (Hasada n.d.).

So it is quite natural to use SWs in an utterance to more vividly express one's emotions. This issue will be discussed later in this paper.

SWs are easily understood by all speakers of a language because a certain sound and a certain meaning correspond to each other. This is learned while being exposed to and confronted with one's own culture. Table 3 gives a summary of SWs, and shows the tendency of meanings corresponding to particular sounds in Japanese. The basic tendency of meanings and the example sentences are based on *A dictionary of basic Japanese grammar* (Makino and Tsutsui 1986:50) and have been rearranged in the table with some additional information given. In table 3, the voiceless phonemes such

as the velar, fricative, bilabial plosive consonants [10]/k/, /s/, /sh/, and /p/ tend to represent something small, light, sharp, and pretty. On the other hand, their voiced counterparts /g/, /z/, and /b/ tend to represent something big, heavy, dull, and dirty. The velar consonants, /k/, is often used to represent hardness, sharpness, clear-cutness, separation, detachment or sudden change. The fricative consonants, /s/, /sh/ and /z/, rather tend to represent a quiet state or a quiet and quick motion. The consonant /sh/ in particular seems to represent a calm human emotion. The bilabial plosive consonants, /p/ and /b/, tend to represent explosiveness, crispness, strength and suddenness. The trill consonant, /r/, tends to represent fluidity, smoothness or slipperiness. The nasal consonants, /m/ and /n/, represent tactuality, warmth and softness. The semi-vowel, /y/, often stands for weakness, slowness and softness. The back close vowel, /u/, is used in sounds referring to something that has to do with human physiology or psychology. The back close-mid vowel, /o/, basically has a negative connotation in respect to human psychology. The front close vowel, /i/, tends to represent brightness, something small, and quick emotion, the front close-mid vowel, /e/, on the contrary, represents something vulgar. Each SW is an adverb associated with a specific verb. The adverb is often followed by the quote marker '*to*' because in Japanese, a SW is perceived as a quotation.

[10] All the Japanese transcriptions used in this research are phonemic not phonetic.

	Sounds	Examples
Velar Consonant (hardness, sharpness, clear-cutness, separation, detachment, sudden change)	**Voiceless /k/**	*Kirakira hikaru* 'to shine sparklingly'
	Voiced /g/	*Giragira hikaru* 'to shine dazzlingly'
Fricative (Sibilant) Consonant (a quiet state, a quiet and quick motion) */sh/ in particular seems to represent some calm human emotion	**Voiceless /s/ /sh/**	*Sat to tachiagaru* 'stand up quickly' *shonbori suru* 'to be despondent'
	Voiced /z/	*Zakuzaku kiru* 'to cut a thick, heavy, object'
Bilabial Plosive Consonant (explosiveness, crispiness, strength, suddenness)	**Voiceless /p/**	*Potapota* ochiru 'little amount of liquid drips'
	Voiced /b/	*Botabota* ochiru 'large amount of liquid drips'
Trill Consonant (fluidity, smoothness, slipperiness)	**/r/**	*Surasura kotaeru* 'to answer with great ease'
Nasal Consonant (tactuality, warmth, softness)	**/m/ /n/**	*Nurunuru shiteiru* 'tobe slimy'
Semi-vowel (weakness, slowness, softness)	**/y/**	*Yoboyobo ni naru* 'to become senile'
Back Close Vowel (something that has to do with human physiology or psychology)	**/u/**	*Ukiuki suru* 'to be buoyant'
Back Close-mid Vowel (something basically negative with regard to human psychology)	**/o/**	*Odoodo shiteiru* 'to be nervous'
Front Close Vowel (brightness, small, quick motion)	**/i/**	*Kirakira hikaru* 'to shine sparklingly'
Front Close-mid Vowel (something vulgar)	**/e/**	*Herahera warau* 'to laugh meaninglessly when embarrassed'

Table 3: The tendency of meanings in the Japanese sound symbolic words

Yamauchi (1978), a Japanese psychologist, investigated verbal clues of affective and emotional states. Forty-two affective and emotional words, partly illustrated in table

4, were selected out of 281 onomatopoeias, and were divided into five factors by means of the statistical method of principal components analysis. From his findings the author concludes that the words selected are a useful cue for further study in measuring affection and emotion.

Factor	Emotion	Examples for Sound Symbolic Words
First factor	fear/worry	hiyahiya, sowasowa, dogimagi, odoodo
Second factor	happiness	hot, uttori, ukiuki, wakuwaku
Third factor	surprise	gyot, hyat, dokit, bikut
Forth factor	sadness	shobon, gakkuri, kuyokuyo, gakut
Fifth factor	anger	Iraira, muramura, tsuntun, katka

Table 4: The sound symbolic words in the five factors of emotions

Various SWs found in '*kokoro*' will be dealt with in detail in chapter three.

2.2 Previous Research on Natsume Soseki's Novel '*Kokoro*'

'*Kokoro*' has been the most paid-attention-to work of Natsume Soseki's novels, which are the mainstream of modern Japanese literature. Over the past few decades a considerable number of studies has been made on this novel. Though much research has been done so far on this novel, no one has approached it by using linguistic methods, let alone the cognitive linguistic approach. This section, therefore, will deal with aspects of the historical, social and cultural background of the novel, which play the most important role in structuring Sensei's and K's cognitive models through which they, being the main figures, conceptualize the world around them.

2.2.1 Studies on Sensei's and K's characters

Kimura (1991) investigated the images of the two main characters, Sensei and K, concentrating mainly on the historical and social background, as it is mirrored in the novel. Kimura pointed out that the character of K, especially, reflected the attitude of 'young generation' at a certain period of time from 1868 to 1912 AD, which corresponds to the Japanese Meiji era.

2.2.2 Historical background

Kimura (1991) concluded that roughly the time around the years 1897-1907 AD (corresponding to the first half of the 30's of the Meiji era) would make a most appropriate background for the time when Sensei and K were young. The author grounds his calculation on the concreteness of the social aspects depicted in the text. Let us look at one of the examples[11] with Kimura's comments: 'The head of it had been killed, the woman believed, in the Sino-Japanese War' (McClellan 1957:145). The description was interpreted as matching the period following the Sino-Japanese War, thus after 1895 AD (the 28th year of the Meiji era), and this would be an appropriate time for the scene of Sensei's and K's tragedy. Based on this fact and other descriptions in the text, the history of Sensei's life is displayed in the following table.

[11] All quotations from the novel given in English are based on the translation by McClellan 1957.

Western Year	Japanese Year of Meiji	Sensei's Age	Events
1876	9	0	Born
1894	27	19	Enter high school
1895 Sep	28	20	Asked to marry to uncle's daughter
1896 Sep	29	21	Offered to marry to uncle's daughter
1897 Sep	30	22	Uncle's embezzlement was found and left hometown
1897 Sep-1900 July	30 33	22-25	Time spent with *K* as university students in Tokyo

Table 5: The history of Sensei's life

2.2.3 K's character and Japanese society in the first half of the 20's of Meiji era

Kimura (1991) analyzed Japanese society in the period between 1894 and 1900 when Sensei and K spent their school days. He said that there were ethical and religious trends in young generation in the year from 1897 to 1907 AD (the 30's of the Meiji era). This new view of life through ethics and religion is reflected in the text:

> He was wearing a rosary around his wrist...he showed me how he counted the beads with his thumb, saying one, two, and so on. (McClellan 1957:167)

> I also noticed a Bible in his room...K said that the Bible was there for no particular reason, except that he thought it only natural that one should read a book so highly valued by others. He added that he intended to read the Koran when he had the opportunity. (McClellan 1957:167)

> Having been born in a temple, he often spoke of "concentration of mind". And to me, it seemed that this phrase described completely his daily life. (McClellan 1957:165)

Kimura claims that K's devoting himself to the way of 'concentration of mind' was the result of promotion made by the ethical and religious atmosphere around that

time. Such social aspects would give a plausible characterization of the people around the time.

2.2.4 Japanese indirect communication style

At the time the novel was written, the emotion of love between men and women was considered as something not to be directly expressed. Sensei, the main character in '*Kokoro*' even says in the text that,

> During the long period of time that we lived in the same house, there were of course many opportunities for me to tell Ojosan directly how I felt towards her, but I purposely ignored them. I was then very conscious of the fact—perhaps too much so—that to speak to Ojosan about marriage before I has spoken to Okusan [her mother] would be a flagrant breach of Japanese custom. On the other hand, it was not this alone that prevented me from confessing my love to Ojosan. I was also afraid that if she did not by any chance want me for a husband, she would not say so outright. I thought that Japanese people, especially Japanese women, lacked the courage to be bluntly truthful on such occasions. (English translation by McClellan 1957:200-201)

Sensei's behavior reveals a great deal about the Japanese 'indirect' communicative style; unexpressed desires and feelings are considered signs of humility, which, again, is considered appropriate. The importance of 'intuitive' understanding in Japanese communication has been well noted in the literature. In Japanese culture, not openly stating what one thinks and feels is so inherent that what is verbally expressed is in fact not believed to be a true reflection of a person's feelings. Travis (1996:59) says 'One of the reasons the Japanese do not express their feelings is because they believe that feelings should be interpreted without their verbal expression'. This is quite different from the norm operating in Anglo-Saxon society, where, as long as on one would not directly hurt another person, open expression of one's feelings and opinions is generally valued and appreciated, and people are encouraged to say what they think. 'Intuitive' understanding is clearly not as essential for smooth communication in Anglo-Saxon society as it is in Japanese society.

Let us compare Japanese and American cultures on the concept of ACTIVE; PASSIVE. In relation to American culture, Lakoff and Johnson (1980:24) state:

> There are cultures where balance or centrality plays a much more important role than it does in our culture. Or consider the nonspatial orientation active-passive. For us ACTIVE IS UP and PASSIVE IS DOWN in most matters. But there are cultures where passivity is valued more than activity.

This is comparable to the Japanese culture in terms of interpersonal relations, and communicative norms, which values passivity more than activity. Such differences show that the concept ACTIVE; PASSIVE in Japanese culture is oriented in a way that differs from American culture. In Japan PASSIVE IS UP and ACTIVE IS DOWN in most matters.

2.2.5 Japan as the 'shame' 'honor' and 'self-respect' culture

Kobayashi (1989) begins her paper by asking the question why Sensei missed his good opportunities to confess his feelings towards Ojosan to K although he could have done so. Then he could have avoided his tragedy. Why did he always renounce it once he had decided to do so? Kobayashi claims that his indecisiveness is not the reason that caused Sensei to commit suicide, but rather his strong self-respect and the high-pride found in his character are the sequential reason for it. She gave some examples to prove her insistence. The first example is seen in contradiction between what Sensei said and what he actually felt. Sensei said that 'before K moved in with us, it was my fear of being duped that had stopped me from approaching Okusan about her daughter' (McClellan 1957:199). That is, Sensei wanted K to move into the relationship between Sensei and Ojosan. This character trait of his is seen in the fact that Sensei wants to be chosen when K is in the relationship between him and Ojosan. But when K actually came into the relationship by confessing that he had a feeling of love toward Ojosan, Sensei went as far as to feel *osoroshisa* 'fear', and thought *shimatta* 'gosh'. This contradiction clearly shows his strong self-respect. The second

fact is in Sensei's statement that he simply abhors the idea of living with a woman who might secretly have been preferring someone else to him. Kobayashi also sees that Sensei's consciousness adhering to *haji* 'shame' and *mentsu* 'honor', which was supposedly rooted in his strong self-respect, controlled and limited what he wanted to say to others. *Mentsu* and *haji* are inevitable matters when talking about the indigenous Japanese mind. A Japanese dictionary (Kenbo, ed. 1993) defines *haji* as 'shame' or 'losing honor', and 'Kenkyusha's Lighthouse Japanese-English dictionary' (Kojima 1984) defines it as 'shame', 'humiliation' and 'disgrace', and *mentsu* as 'honor', 'prestige', 'credit', and 'dignity'. Benedict (1946) describes Japanese culture as a typical shame culture, saying that Japanese act only to avoid criticism, ridicule, or rejection. Accordingly, as long as one's bad behavior is not exposed to public scrutiny, one need not feel ashamed. Benedict also talks about how one appears to the public eye which is closely related to the sense of shame. And she states that the Japanese are more afraid of feeling ashamed after committing a sin than the sin itself. Because of the fear of being regarded as indecent by society, people refrain from an act which is offensive to public moral codes. People are anxious to keep their self-respect, which will be preserved as long as they appear to be respectable to the public. Consequently, they tend to act according to the social codes of behavior that tell them what to do.

The cultural or social backgrounds around the period of Sensei's and K's life and Japanese general behavior do surely reflect their cognitive models as they become apparent in the novel '*Kokoro*', especially in part three. And these models structure how they conceptualize the world around them. Concerning the emotional aspect, a variety of cognitive models are involved and expressed in the Japanese language used in part three of the novel as the reflections of the basis for sensual, physical, physiological, cultural, social, and typical Japanese behavior. These cognitive models, evidently particular for Japanese culture, are expressed in the use of specific Japanese linguistic forms such as metonymies and metaphors.